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Abstract: Naturalness is an extra-empirical quality that aims to assess plausibility of a theory.
Finetuning measures are often deputized to quantify the task. However, knowing statistical
distributions on parameters appears necessary. Such meta-theories are not known yet. A
critical discussion of these issues is presented, including their possible resolutions in fixed
points. Both agreement to and skepticism of naturalness’s utility remains credible, as is
skepticism to any extra-empirical theory assessment (SEETA) that claims to identify “more
correct” theories that are equally empirically adequate. The severe implications of SEETA
are set forward in some detail. We conclude with a summary and discussion of the viability of
three main viewpoints toward naturalness and finetuning, where the “moderate naturalness
position” is suggested to be most appealing, not suffering from the disquietudes of the extreme
pro- and anti-naturalness positions.
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1 Extra-empirical attributes of theories
Empirical adequacy 1 is the pre-eminent requirement of a theory. However, a key problem in
science is the underdetermination of theory based on observed phenomena. Many theories, in
fact an infinite number of theories, are consistent with all known observations. This assertion
may be qualitatively true, but assuredly it is technically true when we realize that there
are a finite number of observations made to compare with theory, and all observations have
uncertainty (e.g., the mass of the Z boson is MZ = 91.1876± 0.0021 GeV [2]).
Faced with a large number of concordant theories (i.e., equally empirically adequate), one
looks to additional extra-empirical criteria to further refine assessments of their value. These
extra-empirical attributes to theories include simplicity, testability, falsifiability2 , naturalness,
calculability, and diversity. None of these attributes has been proven to be logically necessary
for an authentic theory3, although an authentic theory may possess them. However, there still
may be important reasons to evoke these considerations in the pursuit of scientific progress.
For example, a scientist may wish to make a discovery in his/her lifetime, in which case
promptly testable theories are more important to work on than theories judged to be more
likely but not promptly testable. Or, a scientist may wish to widen her vision of observable
consequences of concordant theories in order to cast a wider experimental net, which would
lead her to pursue diverse theories over simple theories.
Another preference might be to identify the subset of concordant theory(ies) most likely to
be authentic among the much larger collection of concordant theories. Simplicity, falsifiability,
calculability, etc., are all not reliable guides to answer this question. However, among the
extra-empirical attributes naturalness [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] is the one that most
directly speaks to this goal. If the naturalness of a theory has any value at all, it is because it
appeals to our quest to sort concordant theories into likely and unlikely candidates – natural
and unnatural theories.
2 Finetuning functional
In practice, naturalness is often closely tied to notions of finetuning. A theory is unnatural if
its parameters require a high degree of finetuning to match observables or other parameters
1Italicized words appearing in this article are defined in more detail in [1].
2For future discussion, the distinction between “testable” and “falsifiable” theories will be important. A
“testable” theory is “one that contains at least one point in parameter space that is capable of yielding
evidence for new physics beyond the standard theory in future experiments,” whereas a “falsifiable theory”
is one “whose entire parameter space could conceivably be ruled out (i.e., shown to be non-concordant) by a
specified collection of experiments and analysis that can be done in the future” [1]. A falsifiable theory is a
testable theory, but a testable theory might not be falsifiable.
3In [1] an authentic theory is defined to be “... one that has a point in its parameter space ... that
is concordant with any conceivable experiment that could possibly be performed in the theory’s domain of
applicability.” More colloquially, it is the “correct theory” or, in the case of a less ambitious effective theory,
a “more correct theory” or “deeper theory.”
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when matching across effective theories (EFTs), and a theory is natural otherwise. One first
constructs a finetuning functional FT on a theory T to map the theory to a number FT [T ],
which is its finetuning. For example, let us denote a set of parameters of the theory by xi,
and a set of observables by Ok. A candidate finetuning functional could be [13, 14]
FT [T ] = max
∑
ik
∣∣∣∣ xiOk ∂Ok∂xi
∣∣∣∣ . (1)
The higher the value of FT [T ] the more finetuned it is and the less likely it is to be natural,
according to this algorithm. For example, one could decide that a theory is natural, or “FT-
natural”, only if FT [T ] < FN , for some critical finetuning value of FN .
As the reader may note there are many choices and assumption made beyond identifying
the theory to assess whether a theory is FT-natural. In order to construct a finetuning func-
tional one must begin by choosing a parametrization of the theory, which is not unique. For
example, the many different schemes of renormalizable theories (MS-bar, on-shell, etc.) lead
to different parametrizations, and in many non-renormalizable theories completely different
basis sets of operators are possible through manipulations of the equations of motion. Starting
with a particular basis with particular coefficients it is often possible to go to another basis
where coefficients of operators are zero, which may look to the unsuspecting as a magical
finetuning.
In addition, the finetuning functional is applied to observable(s). The list of observables
in a theory is infinite. Even if we limit ourselves to so-called counting observables, there are
an infinite number. For example, there are an infinite number of kinematic configurations of
e+e− → µ+µ− that are rightly classified as observables. Of course, if there are n parameters
of the theory then it is usually possible to pick n observables such that all other observables
then derive from those. However, the difficulty is choosing which n observables to use in
the finetuning functional. An algorithmic method to choose which n observables given some
arbitrary theory would only give false comfort in the face of arbitrariness.
To illustrate further arbitrariness, let us suppose we are allowed to redefine an observable
as a function of observables. In that case, we can always construct observables with unit
finetuning. The method to do this is to first begin with a set of n parameters {xi}, and a set
of n observables {yi}. Then,
yi = fi(x1, x2, . . . , xn) i = 1, 2, . . . , n (2)
If we invert these equations we can obtain the parameters in terms of the observables
xi = f
−1
i (y1, y2, . . . , yn) i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (3)
We now define a new set of observables that are
yˆi = f
−1
i (y1, y2, . . . , yn) i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (4)
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With these observables we find that finetuning is always unity
FT =
∣∣∣∣xiyˆk ∂yˆk∂xi
∣∣∣∣ = xi(xk) ∂(xk)∂xi (5)
=
xi
xk
δik = 1 (6)
Let us now suppose that such constructions of redefined variables are not allowed and
that there is an algorithm to choose observables and parameters that is a priori agreed upon
to assess finetuning. Following such a procedure is analogous to experimental searches that
search the data for new physics signatures using pre-defined cuts or procedures. It is usually
bad practice to bin the data after it is accrued with the sole purpose of maximizing a statistical
anomaly, or minimizing it. One decides before the analysis and opens up the box to see if
there are anomalies.
However, even with such an approach there are still concerns. For example, let us suppose
we have an observable y that depends on the input parameter xn according to y = xn, where
n is some integer power. In this case, the higher the value of n the more finetuned the theory.
However, it is rather transparent that different powers of n do not affect naturalness as one
would intuit. The trouble is that this finetuning value is the same no matter what value of x
the theory provides, and therefore no matter what the value of the observable y. Yet, if the
theory provides a value of x then there simply is a value of y that comes out. This problem
with the finetuning measure was recognized by Anderson & Castan˜o [15, 16] who attempted
to fix the measure by stating a new finetuning functional needs to be defined which is the
old finetuning functional divided by the average finetuning. In the y = xn case, the average
finetuning is n, since it is the same over all values of x and thus the new finetuning function
returns a finetuning of 1 (n divided by average finetuning of n) for all possible values of n.
This appears to be going in the right direction, and in cases like this is responsive to our
intuitions about finetuning.
However, the Anderson, Castan˜o finetuning functional has its own difficulties. For example,
most examples are not as simple as the one above – they do not have a constant finetuning
for any input parameters xi. And when the finetuning changes over values of the parameters
xi then one has no choice but to introduce a probability measure over xi in order to get
an “average finetuning.” Such a probability measure introduces yet another extra-empirical
assumption about the theory, turning it into a meta-theory, which further calls into question
the finetuning functional used to assess naturalness. In addition, since finetuning itself is not
firmly rooted in probability theory, adding a sub-component of the functional that introduces
probabilities over parameters introduces the burden of justifying probabilities for part of the
calculation and then inexplicably abandons them when applying the finetuning calculation.
Let us now give an example of how the finetuning functional, even corrected according
to Anderson and Castan˜o, can be at odds with probabilistic intepretations of observable
measurements. In many theories, high finetuning results from the cancellation of two large
numbers. Let us represent the observable by y and the two large parameters as x1 and x2.
The concern is over finetuning for y = x1 − x2. In the Standard Model such an algebraic
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equation is used to discuss the cancellation of a bare mass term of the Higgs boson with
a large cut-off dependent quadratic divergence Λ2. Or, more physically, the renormalized
SM Higgs mass parameter with a large one-loop correction from an exotic singlet scalar or
vector-like quarks [8, 10]. In supersymmetric theories, the condition for successful electroweak
symmetry breaking has the form y = x1 − x2 where y = m2Z and x1 ∝ m2Hu and x2 ∝ m2Hd
(see, e.g., eq. 8.1.12 of [17]). m2Hu and m
2
Hd
are supersymmetric breaking parameters which
in many theories of supersymmetric are correlated with superpartner masses of the quarks,
leptons and gauge bosons. Since high-energy collisions of LHC have not found superpartners
it is expected that these masses are greater than ∼ 1.5 TeV. This implies that m2Hu and m2Hd
may be greater than a TeV and thus much larger than mZ .
In all these cases, the concern becomes requiring y = x1 − x2 when x1, x2  y. It looks
like a “finetuned cancellation”. Our intuition even suggests that it would be odd that a very
large value of x1 would cancel with a very large value of x2 to give me a small value of y. The
finetuning functional puts a number on that intuition:
FT =
1
2
2∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣xiy ∂y∂xi
∣∣∣∣ = 12
∣∣∣∣x1 + x2x1 − x2
∣∣∣∣ = x¯y (7)
where x¯ is the average of x1 and x2. If we applied the Anderson-Castan˜o procedure to this
we would have to determine what the probability distributions are of x1 and x2, then find the
average FT value and then divide the above equation by that. Thus, it would only change the
above equation by a constant and not qualitative change the conclusion that very small values
of y compared to much larger values of x1 and x2 are finetuned and therefore unnatural. In
the next section we look at this example from the point of view of probability.
3 Finetuning and probability
For the case of y = x1 − x2, how rooted in probability and viability is such a finetuning
measure as given by eq. 7? In order to assess this we must assume some probability measure
over x1 and x2. If we assume some reasonable probability over these variables and show that
FT assessment is incompatible with probability assessments of likely outcome for y, we have
further reason to suspect the finetuning functional is not a good quantitative measure to assess
naturalness. Let us assume that x1 and x2 are flatly distributed over the range of 0 to 1. Now,
we will approach the question of how likely is a small value of y (y  1) from two points of
view.
First, we can ask, given the probability distributions of x1 and x2 is a particular outcome
for y improbable. Such questions are often asked in statistics and the first thing one does is
finds the probability density function for f(y) given the probability density functions for f1(x1)
and f2(x2). When x1 and x2 are independent random variables the result is a convolution
f(y) =

1 + y for − 1 < y < 0,
1− y for 0 < y < 1
0 otherwise
(8)
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Figure 1: Probability density function f(y) for y = x1 − x2 where x1 and x2 are flatly
distributed from 0 to 1. The peak of f(y) is at y = 0, which according to one interpretation
calls into question the claim that small values of y in this case are unnatural.
which is depicted in fig. 1. From the probability distribution f(y) there appears to be no
compelling argument that the “finetuned” values of y  1 are improbable. On the contrary,
such low values of y are the most probable outcomes. Measurements of y near zero would
be near the peak of the probability density of y. If we ask what central value of y0 would
give the largest probability after integrating over some range of ∆y, we would have to answer
y0 = 0. From this perspective it is hard to say that tiny values of y are improbable, unless
somebody employs the specious argument that any exact value of y is improbable, which
would inappropriately rule out all values of y.
It could be argued that considering equal flat distributions for x1 and x2 from 0 to 1 is not
applicable analogy for realistic discussions of finetuning in physical theories, and it should be
a different distribution. Perhaps the distributions should be narrow and far away from zero.
Perhaps one should be skewed very differently than the other. There are many possibilities,
all of which are a priori possible in this discussion. The point of the above illustration is
to show that one’s view of finetuned cancellations depends on one’s assumptions about the
distributions, and it is incumbent upon the practitioner to articulate clearly the finetuning
measure’s connection to probability. Such descriptions and qualifications may even be posited
and then tested for how well they conform with data requirements and naturalness intuitions,
such was partially done in the discussions on “focus point supersymmetry” [18, 19].
A second way to view this problem is to ask what is the probability of obtaining a value
of |y| below some small chosen value ξ given a probability distribution of x1 and x2 near a
critical point y = 0. In fig. 2 the inverse of that probability is plotted (dashed green line).
For example, if we assume |y| < ξ, the probability to achieve it is ∼ 2ξ for ξ  1. Such
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Figure 2: Finetuning computation and inverse probability of |y| < ξ when y = x1−x2 with x1
and x2 flatly distributed from 0 to 1. The inverse probability of achieving very low values of
|y| is correlated well, but not one-to-one, with finetuning in this example. xmax is defined to be
max(x1, x2) in the computation for finetuning. The larger the xmax the higher the finetuning
to achieve low |y|.
a measure yields results similar to traditional finetuning measures. However, plotting the
finetuning functional value on this plot requires know xmax = max(x1, x2), since finetuning
depends on x¯. For example, if xmax = 1 (upper yellow line), then it is even more finetuning
to have |y| < ξ = 10−3 than if xmax = 0.1 (lower red line). Thus, the FT functional does
not return a unique mapping from probability for |y| < ξ but at least it returns that higher
finetuning means lower probability, and thus has some probabilistic correlation.
Despite the more faithful matching of the second algorithm to compute probabilities (cf.
fig. 2) than the first algorithm (cf. fig. 1), it is unclear that the second algorithm is more
appropriate than the first. It may be just as justified (i.e., arbitrary) to ask what the proba-
bility is of |y| ≥ ξ or ξ/2 < |y| < 2ξ as it is to ask |y| ≤ ξ, unless one invokes an additional
principle that being close to a “critical” point in the theory is the reference point where we
should compute probabilities. In our case, y = 0 is the interface between symmetry breaking
(y < 0) and non-symmetry breaking (y > 0) in a Higgs potential.
Another way of seeing that the second approach could fail at times is to image that
the distributions of x1 and x2 yield zero probability density for y = 0.013 but a significant
probability density for |y| ≤ 0.013. The second approach of attaching viability significance
to y = 0.013 based on computing the probability that P (|y| < 0.013) clearly fails, whereas
asking for the value of f(y = 0.013) to compare with the full probability density function of
y is defensible. However, it may only be defensible when probability is zero.
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Figure 3: Probability density function f(y) for y = xn for different values of n and for x flatly
distributed from 0 to 1.
Let us return to the example earlier of the observable y depending on parameter x through
y = xn. We had stated earlier that it was nonsensical that naturalness should depend on n,
and then found that Anderson-Castan˜o rectified this problem by stating that the finetuning
functional should be divided by the average value of finetuning. In that case, FT = 1 for
all choices of x and for all choices of n. However, if we put a probability density on x and
ask about probability of y rather than finetuning of y, we get a very different answer. Fig. 3
depicts the probability density functions fn(y) for various values of n given a flat distribution
of x from 0 to 1. We see that for high powers of n the probability for lower values of y greatly
increases. The finetuning functional does not reveal this issue.
It is interesting to revisit what we discussed above about redefining sets of observables
with respect to this specific case. If we are allowed to construct new observables yˆi as a
function of some canonical set of independent observables yi, as we discussed above, yˆi =
f−1i (y1, y2, . . . , yn) we can always make a construction where FT = 1. In this specific case with
y = xn, one can redefine yˆ = y1/n and thus yˆ = x and FT = 1. Furthermore, the probability
density of yˆ is flat from 0 to 1. This calls into question the FT measure, but it does not call
into question the probability measure. A flat probability for yˆ is equally meaningful to assess
the viability of the theory as is the skewed and peaked probability distribution for y. However,
the ability to redefine observables as functions of observables to get different FT values would
mean loss of utility since it is not grounded in assessing probabilities.
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4 Probability and naturalness
After considering finetuning and the criticisms of the finetuning functional as a quantita-
tive means to assess naturalness, we have been led to notions of probability distributions on
parameters. If naturalness has any connection to the extra-empirical judgments of theory
plausibility, which is surely what naturalness discussion is after, we have no recourse but to
introduce probability measures across parameters of the theory. A corollary to this is that
any discussion about naturalness that does not unambiguously state assumptions about the
probability distributions of parameters of the theory cannot be rooted in probability theory
and therefore has little to do with theory plausibility.
Now, any explicit claims about probability distributions of parameters is highly controver-
sial, and appears to go beyond the normal scientific endeavor. However, we can discuss normal
science within the language of probability distributions on parameters. For example, normal
tests of a theory can be reinterpreted as an assumption of δ(xi−xthi )-function distributions on
parameters, which then can be used to compute the distribution of the observables through
ythi (x
th
1 , x
th
2 , . . .). In the limit of perfect errorless theory calculation the probability distribution
of the observables would also be δ-functions: f(ythi ) = δ(yi − ythi ).
If there is theory uncertainty in the calculation, e.g. from finite order perturbation theory,
the δ-function distribution of parameters become a somewhat spread-out probability distri-
bution for the observables, whose distribution (and therefore uncertainty) is hard to know,
but the standard deviation might be estimated to be the difference in values obtained for the
observables when varying the renormalization scale by a factor of two below and above the
characteristic energy of the observable process (e.g., mb/2 < µ < 2mb in b-meson observables
calculations). But that just complicates the discussion unnecessarily, so let us go back and
assume that theory is perfect and we start with a δ-function distribution on parameters and
obtain a δ-function distribution of observables, and we compare those observables to the data,
which often Gaussian distributed.
Next, fancy statistical tests are done to see if the predictions are compatible with the
measurements, and if so the theory is said to agree with the data and the choice of parameters
is then declared acceptable. One does this many times over small changes in the arguments
of the δ-function distributions on parameters and finds the full space of parameters where
theory predictions are in agreement with observables. In the limiting case that the theory
is a valid one, and theory is calculated perfectly, and experiments yield exact results, the
δ(xi − xth)-function distributions of parameters yield a δ(yi − ythi ) distribution of observables
that exactly match the data with ythi = y
expt
i .
The concept of naturalness invites the theoretician to go beyond this procedure. In the
language above, it invites us to consider a distribution of input parameters that are not δ
functions but something more complicated with finite extent. Perhaps the parameters are
flatly distributed, or Gaussian distributed, skew-distributed, or something even more compli-
cated. Either way, a choice on distributions must be made or recognized somehow, and then
a probability assessment on some outcome must be made. The questions then proliferate:
What parameters do I attach probability distributions to? How does one determine which
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probability distributions are appropriate? What outcomes (observables, parameters?) do I
check for probable or improbable? How is probable vs. improbable demarcated? All of these
questions must be addressed in one form or another. Failure to do so renders any naturalness
discussion fuzzy with diminished meaning. At the same time, answering these questions is a
highly speculative endeavor given our current understanding of quantum field theory and na-
ture. This is what ultimately may bar naturalness from meaningful technical discourse, even
if its qualitative usefulness could be established. Nevertheless, it is useful to press forward to
see if there are qualitative lessons one can learn about theories and their relative degree of
probability or improbability compared to other theories.
The above discussion further begs the question of why there should be a probability distri-
bution on parameters at all. Well, there is the formulation of normal science discussed above
which is already in terms of probability distributions on parameters, which are δ-functions.
And so, a commitment to a particular distribution function has already been made implicitly
from this perspective. The question becomes then whether there is another distribution func-
tion that is more appropriate. In Landscape discussions it is plausible that parameters are the
result of a random choice among a semi-infinite number of solutions from a more fundamental
theory. If our universe is one random choice out of these infinite ones we certainly require that
the probability of that choice be non-zero. That is not controversial. What becomes more
controversial is that we might even wish to demand that the probability of our universe’s
choice of outcomes be “generic.” In other words, we may wish to require that the value of the
joint probability density function over outcomes is not atypically tiny.
5 Probability flows of gauge couplings
We have already looked at both the finetuning interpretations and probability interpretations
of the cases y = xn and y = x1 − x2 for xi inputs and y output. One of the conclusions
from that discussion is that finetuning assessments might be useful for judging the plausibility
of a theory but only if they match a coherent probability interpretation, and probability
interpretations are only possible when distributions on parameters are specified. Let us now
proceed to investigate the IR implications of a probability distribution on a UV value of gauge
couplings.
First, let us explore the probability flow of QCD gauge coupling. We begin by assuming a
flat probability distribution of MS-bar g3(MH) coupling at MH = 10
15 GeV with values from
0 to 0.6, chosen such that g3(Q) ≤
√
4pi (“finite”) down to MZ . To be clear, this is an ansatz
whose implications will be explored. For simplicity we only consider the one-loop β function
for the renormalization group evolution of g3, which is
dg3
d logQ
= − b
2
g33, where b =
7
8pi2
. (9)
The solution to this equation is
g3(Q) =
g3(MH)√
1− g3(MH)2b(Q)
, where b(Q) = b ln(MH/Q). (10)
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Note, b(Q) monotonically increases as Q flows to the IR.
Eq. 10 is analogous to our y = xn equation given earlier, where y = g3(Q) and x = g3(MH).
We know (or rather posit) the distribution on x and we want to know the resulting distribution
on y. Let us compute the distribution function for g3(MZ) assuming the above-stated flat
distribution on g3(MH). The probability density function is
f(g3(MZ)) =
1√
4pi
(1 + 4pi b(MZ))
1/2
(1 + g3(MZ)2 b(MZ))3/2
. (11)
If we had chosen g3(MH) to be flat from 0 to
√
4pi rather than flat from 0 to 0.6 then 83%
(= 1 − 0.6/√4pi) of the probability distribution would have flowed to a divergent value of
g3(MZ). In that case the probability density function could be represented by
f ′(g3(MZ)) = 0.17 f(g3(MZ)) + 0.83 δ(g3(MZ)−
√
4pi) (12)
where we have let g3(MZ) =
√
4pi be the value of g3(MZ) where all the probability now resides
for divergent coupling. This is a complication that can be handled, but it is avoided by the
original assumption that g(MH) is flatly distributed from 0 to 0.6, and our probability density
function f(g3(MZ)) of eq. 11 holds.
As we see from fig. 4 that f(g3(MZ)) peaks at low values of g3(MZ). At first this may
seem counter-intuitive, since the g3 rises toward the infrared, and so should it not be more
probable to have higher values? The answer is that g3 = 0 is a fixed point (albeit unstable)
of the one-loop β function and so low values of g3 in the UV stay low in the IR whereas
higher values of g3 in the UV diverge rapidly in the IR. One can see this behavior by plotting
probability flow lines for g3(Q), where evenly spaced values g3(MH) are chosen to reflect its
flat distribution and then evolved down to low scales. See fig. 5. The flow lines are denser
for lower values of g3(Q) than at higher values of g3(MZ). The density of flow lines at MZ is
indicative of the probability distribution of g3(MZ) at MZ . Thus, there is higher probability
for lower values.
How are we to interpret the flow of probability density, as defined above? It appears that
nature’s choice of g3 appears to be more probable or less probable depending on what scale
we evaluate it. A quantum field theorist might immediately recoil from this conclusion, since
we are used to the maxim that observables (i.e., things that have meaning and a fixed value
independent of how you might calculate them) cannot depend on what arbitrary scale you
use to conduct perturbation theory. However, we are not computing observables, and so the
maxim need not apply. Nevertheless, we are left asking what scale is most appropriate to ask
about the local probability density of a coupling’s value. As we discuss at the end of this
section, the resolution to this question is that the scale does not matter if we specify a finite
integration domain. In terms of values of the couplings, RG flow will expand and contract
that finite domain at different scales but the total probability within will remain fixed.
As with most probability discussions, it is fruitful to think of betting. If a distribution is
given at the high scale for g3(MH) and one is given a ∆g3 chip of some fixed finite range to
place at the MZ scale, what choice of position g3(MZ) would you put this chip? If one believes
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Figure 4: The probability density function of g3(MZ) if g3(MH) at MH = 10
15 GeV is assumed
to be flatly distributed from 0 to
√
4pi.
that that question makes sense and there is a computable answer, which appears to be so,
then one might be convinced of probability flows of coupling distributions from RG evolution.
We note that in normal science, where δ-function distributions are implicitly assumed for
parameters, RG flow will retain δ-function distribution centered on the coupling throughout
its trajectory. Therefore, there is no conundrum to solve about what scale to evaluate a
coupling’s probability – it is equally 100% probable all throughout its RG flow.
Another implication of this discussion is that a flat probability distribution of a non-
abelian gauge coupling from 0 to ∞ in the UV would push an infinite number of flow lines
into a confining territory well before reaching our low value of ΛQCD and thus our theory would
be vanishingly improbable. Note, this conclusion could not be made by looking only at the
high scale flat distribution, which says any value is equally likely. Only after RGE flow does
one see that the non-infinite coupling density function (where g3(Q) <
√
4pi by convention
here) becomes infinitesimal after RG flow into the IR. The binary probability determination
of what choices lead to too early confinement and what choices lead to QCD at Q ≤ ΛQCD is
easy to make, and in that case the realization of QCD would have infinitesimal probability.
For this reason it is somewhat safe to say that if there are probability distributions on QCD
coupling they would not extend uniformly to very high values in the UV.
Repeating this exercise for a non-asymptotically free coupling, such as an abelian gauge
coupling e, one finds that the probability distribution is more peaked at the higher values of
the coupling in the IR given a flat distribution in the UV. As we flow deeper and deeper into
the IR the probability density peaks further and further toward the maximum allowed value
of the coupling as a function of scale. Let us define emax(Q) to be the maximum value of e at
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Figure 5: Probability flow lines for the g3(Q) gauge coupling evolved from MH = 10
15 GeV
to MZ . Equal spacing at MH indicates flat distribution (each value equally likely in the
range), whereas the converging (diverging) of flow lines at MZ indicate increased (decreased)
probability density of g3(MZ) at low (high) values.
the scale Q given a maximum value of e at MH . If
de
d lnQ
=
b
2
e3, with b > 0, then e2max(Q) =
e2max(MH)
1 + e2max(MH)b lnMH/Q
. (13)
Also,
if emax(MH) =∞ =⇒ e2max(Q) =
1
b lnMH/Q
. (14)
If e(MH) is flatly distributed from 0 to emax(MH) then the probability distribution for e(Q) is
f(e(Q)) =
1
emax(Q)
(1− e2max(Q)b lnMH/Q)1/2
(1− e2(Q)b lnMH/Q)3/2 . (15)
where emax(Q) is given in eq. 13.
The first property to note of eq. 15 is that if emax(MH) is indeed infinite the probability
density function diverges at e(Q) = emax(Q). This is because all large RG flow lines, which
were evenly spaced in e(MH) at Q = MH , converge on emax(Q). Only a relatively small number
of lines (actually, infinitesimally small number of lines) converge to values discernably less than
emax(Q). This is because a small number of flow lines near e(MH) ∼ 1 are overwhelmed by the
infinite number of flow lines that started from e(MH) 1. It is in this sense that we can call
emax(Q) a probability flow fixed point. An implication of this discussion is that we know that
a distribution with infinitely many more flow lines for e(MH) 1 than for e(MH) ∼ 1, such as
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a flat distribution, could not have enabled e < emax in the IR with any reasonable probability.
Thus, there is likely a firm upper bound on the distribution of abelian couplings, which is
the same conclusion we reached for non-abelian gauge couplings but for different reasons. Of
course, the theory becomes non-perturbative as the couplings go higher, but the qualitative
message is similar even if the value of the emax(MH) must remain below some agreed upon
perturbative bound.
These same considerations lead one to conclude that emax(Q) is a probabilistic fixed point
deep in the IR independent of what value e started with at MH . To see this we note that the
RG solution (one loop) is
e2(Q) =
e2(MH)
1 + e2(MH)b lnMH/Q
(16)
As Q→ 0 in the IR, the solution increasingly asymptotes to the e(Q)→ 0, but also asymptotes
to emax(Q). The proper way to analyze this is to ask for some initial choice of e(MH) below
emax(MH) what value of does e(Q) have with respect to emax(Q). The answer is
e(Q)
emax(Q)
=
e(MH)
emax(MH)
√
1 + e2max(MH)b lnMH/Q
1 + e2(MH)b lnMH/Q
. (17)
At Q = MH we have e(Q)/emax(Q) = e(MH)/emax(MH), but at Q→ 0 the expression asymp-
totes to e(Q)/emax(Q) = 1. Thus, we can conclude that under high-scale flat distributions
abelian theories asymptote in the IR to their maximum allowed values. This conclusion holds
for many other distributions beyond flat.
To end this section, let us remark that if we have a density function f(x) over a domain
a < x < b, then we can always remap the random variable x into y by y = ψ(x) such that the
domain of y is the minimum and maximum values of ψ(x) over x’s domain a < x < b. By a
suitable choice of ψ(x) one can obtain a distribution function f(y) that is arbitrarily large or
small at y0 = ψ(x0). The implication for this is that knowing the local value of a probability
density function — e.g., f(x0) — is not sufficient to know how likely it is that the value of
x is x0. We can only ask how likely it is to find x in some finite domain (x1, x2) of x-values
enclosing x0, and equivalently how likely it is to find y in the corresponding mapped domain
(ψ(x1), ψ(x2)). That is something one can place and win well-defined bets on, as discussed
above. So, implicit to the above discussion is the assumption that we want to know how likely
is it that the gauge couplings g or e falls within some small window, say g = g0± 0.1, or what
is the probability that the coupling is below some value gˆ. Those are meaningful questions
that can be asked and answered in RG flows on parameter distributions at different any scale,
where the function ψ() is the analog to RG evolution.
6 Fixed points and naturalness
The investigation into probabilistic interpretations of theories has lead us toward fixed points.
Indeed, the intuitions of researchers have always been that low-energy fixed points are the most
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probable values of those couplings. This is based on an implicit assumption of underlying flat
distributions of parameters or distributions not too dissimilar from flat. Furthermore, IR fixed
points have very low finetuning from standard finetuning functionals like those we discussed
above. Very large changes in the UV (input parameters) yield very small deviations in the IR
(output parameters). However, one should caution that even in the presence of fixed points
there are flow lines that deviate far from the fixed point values at some non-zero IR energy,
and probability distributions can be made on the UV inputs that would favor those lines
and disfavor the lesser finetuned values very close to the fixed point. Nevertheless, we can
tentatively hold that low finetuning may be indicative of higher probability for couplings, and
therefore higher plausibility of a theory at that point in parameter space. Again, it must be
emphasized that such a conclusion is based on an implicit assumption of underlying parameter
distributions which are not too dissimilar to flat distributions, and therefore the hint of higher
probability from lower finetuning is not guaranteed.
Probability fixed points of this nature may be used in an interesting way by nature. For
example, the Standard Model may be unified into a grand unified theory (GUT) with large
dimensional representations. In that case, the GUT would not be asymptotically free. If the
GUT gauge coupling is flatly distributed at a very high scale it could yield a convergence of
flow lines to an IR probability fixed point for the coupling. Here the IR refers to the GUT
scale, where the GUT gauge group breaks to the SM model. The high density of flow lines
reflects a large probability density. This large bunching of probability lines at the GUT scale
then acts as inputs to the probability density for the SM gauge couplings. The SU(2) gauge
couplings and especially the abelian U(1)Y gauge coupling squeeze these probability flow lines
even closer together in the IR, peaking the distribution at a very narrow range. The QCD
gauge coupling, since it is asymptotically free, wants to fan the probability lines out and
reduce the probability density along this gmax(Q) trajectory. However, if the original density
function of gmax is sufficiently large at the GUT scale — the flow lines being very packed there
– the fanning out process does not fully unravel the prediction and the low scale coupling
is rather well peaked even for QCD. Fig. 6 depicts the scenario discussed above, where flow
lines are equally spaced at a scale well above the GUT scale, and then RG flow squeezes them
closer together near the upper-limit quasi-fixed point. This could be an argument for GUT
theories not being asymptotically free.
The above discussions on gauge coupling RG flows and probabilistic interpretations is
simplistic from several points of view. First, it was all done in a one-loop analysis, which
enabled us to see analytic formula for RG evolution and probability density functions. One
should go to higher order in RG evolution, which in realistic theories of nature will involve
additional couplings, such as the top Yukawa coupling and the Higgs coupling, albeit at
suppressed order. Nevertheless, fixed point behaviors do change especially in strongly coupled
regimes due to the existence of other couplings entering the flow. Once additional couplings are
added the discussion of probability is greatly intensified. There are probability distributions
that need to be assumed for all the parameters, and their correlations. A large joint probability
function over all parameters is needed, in other words, to analyze further claims of likelihood
of a theory point. A line of inquiry could be to ask what distributions (beyond the obvious
δ-function distributions) of high-scale parameters would yield RG flow lines that converge in
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Figure 6: Probability flow lines for flatly distributed g3(Q) (unified coupling) at a scale of
2 × 1017 GeV evolved according to a strong non-asymptotically free GUT theory down to
1015 GeV and then evolved according to the Standard Model asymptotically free theory from
1015 GeV down to MZ , yielding enhanced probability density at its maximum IR value.
the IR to the measured values. Such theories would then be natural by definition, and likely
would involve little finetuning. However, since no theory has perfect flow to IR fixed point
behavior, the preponderance of lines flowing to the IR fixed point neighborhood may still
not be good enough for the strongest skeptic who would claim that an explicit probability
distribution is needed to make any rigorous statement at all.
7 Implications of skepticism
The critical discussion above leads to a credible skepticism to extra-empirical theory assess-
ments (SEETA). We do not have a meta-theory that provides statistical distributions to
parameters of theories, which is a key problem precision naturalness arguments face. It is
therefore of some use to go through the exercise of promoting SEETA to a guiding principle,
in apposition to naturalness and other extra-empirical assessments, to see what it might lead
to. As we will see, the price of SEETA is rather steep compared to our ordinary intuitions
about assessments of theories and their parameter spaces. Nevertheless, it is important to
articulate these implications so as not to leave SEETA-like thinking nebulous, unexamined,
and perhaps more attractive than it might otherwise be.
For us here, SEETA by definition is the disbelief that extra-empirical theory assessments,
such as naturalness, enable one to find the “correct theory,” or the “more correct theory”
among competing theories. There are many resulting implications once SEETA is adopted,
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of which we highlight a few below.
First, since there is no meta-theory of probability distributions and any criteria to assess
naturalness, such as finetuning measures, are unacceptable to SEETA, there can be no pre-
ferred regions in concordant theory space. Thus, any theory point is as good and a priori
equally likely as another. For this reason, there can be allowed no disillusionment of a theory
even if experiment rules out a “massive fraction” of allowed parameter space, since such dec-
larations implicitly assume some knowledge of probability distributions of parameters, which,
however, is barred from consideration by SEETA. Therefore, as long as there is at least one
theory point that is surviving the theory is still as good as it ever was, and no judgments of
reduced plausibility can be tolerated.
A second related implication of SEETA is that only falsifiable theories allow their plau-
sibility status to change, but only after discovery or after null experiments with total theory
coverage. A falsifiable theory must enable the prospect of all its theory points to be ruled
out by experiment. Here we include the condition that falsifiable theories make predictions
across its entire parameter space that have not yet been confirmed by experiment. If the
entire parameter space of the theory can be covered, then a falsifiable theory will either be
ruled out because nothing new is found, or it is established beyond the standard theory since
a non-trivial prediction was borne out by experiment.
Now, the subtlety with this second implication is that one can extract out of any testable
theory a falsifiable theory. For example, I may have a theory T (e.g., supersymmetry), which
has two regions of parameter space TF and TNF , where T = TF ⊕ TNF. One region, TF , is
the area that makes new predictions and can be non-trivially tested by experiment in the
reasonable future (e.g., very low energy minimal supersymmetry). Another region, TNF, is the
region of parameter space that is not TF. If a theory T has TF 6= ∅ then the theory is testable,
and if TNF = ∅ it is falsifiable. If TNF 6= ∅ then one can declare a new theory T ′ which is the
projection PF of the falsifiable region TF:
T ′ = PF(T ) = PF(TF ⊕ TNF) = TF. (18)
T ′ is a falsifiable theory, albeit artificially created, and its plausibility status is guaranteed
to change after experimental inquiry. An example of this is projecting all of supersymmetry
(T ) down to a very minimal supersymmetric SU(5) GUT with low-scale supersymmetry (TF),
which is falsifiable and indeed was falsified [20].
The difficulty with such falsifiable projections is the sometimes artificial nature of the
division between TF and TNF. The separation between the two is sometimes made not out of
theory considerations, in contrast to the SU(5) supersymmetric GUT example given above,
but rather the perceived boundaries to what experiments are willing and able to achieve in
the near term. For example, if T is supersymmetry, and TF is what the LHC can find, then
there is a tendency to misname T ′ = PF(T ) = TF as “supersymmetry”, and when it is not
found, it is said that “supersymmetry” has been ruled out. In reality, T ′ is better called
“LHC-projected supersymmetry”, and therefore the LHC is capable of ruling out only “LHC-
projected supersymmetry”, and not “supersymmetry,” if it is not found. Projecting T onto
TF to form a falsifiable T
′ based only on recognizing what experiment can and cannot do in
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the near term creates artificial theories whose falsification is not very meaningful.
Finally, a third implication of SEETA is that theory preference then becomes not about
what theory is more likely to be correct but what theory is practically more advantageous
or wanted for other reasons. Such reasons include fewer parameters, easier to calculate, has
new experimental signatures to pursue, interesting connections to other subfields of physics,
mathematical interest, etc. There are many reasons to prefer theories beyond one being more
correct than another — the only attitude unacceptable to SEETA is to say that one theory
is more “correct” or more likely to be correct than another theory that is equally empirically
adequate. No theory of theory preference will be given here, except to say that “diversity”
has a strong claim to a quality for preference4. If theorists only develop and analyze theories
that give the same phenomena, at the expense of exploring other theories equally compatible
with experiment, there becomes the practical problem of not arguing for or analyzing new
signals requiring new experiments. A few examples out of many in the literature that have
the quality of diversity at least going for it are clockwork theories [21, 22] and theories of
superlight dark matter (see, e.g., [23, 24]). These theories lead to new experiments, or new
experimental analyses, that may not have been performed otherwise.
To conclude and summarize the skeptical ethos: theories must be compatible with ex-
periment, and any that are should be viewed as just as likely as any others. There is no
concept of a speculative theory being “almost ruled out” when its parameter space shrinks
due to null experimental results, since such descriptions imply knowledge of as-yet unknown
probability distributions of parameters. Regarding naturalness, it becomes a theory quality
upon a well-defined algorithm to quantify it. Without yet having a meta-theory of probabil-
ity distributions over parameters, one must abandon standard naturalness as a quality that
points to theories that are more likely to be correct, which may be fatal for naturalness since
that is implicitly its main raison d’eˆtre. It is important, nevertheless, to continue to assess
theories beyond their empirical adequacy. Seeking diversity is one example of a potentially
fruitful extra-empirical criterion. Other qualities such as simplicity, calculability, consilience,
etc., may also be useful practical qualities to declare preferred theories. However, as argued,
there is no known guaranteed justification to call these preferred theories more correct.
8 Summary: three positions on naturalness and fine-
tuning
In the way of summary, three viewpoints that have been coursing through the discussion will
now be directly expressed, and a brief appraisal of their viabilities will be given in light of the
above discussion.
First, there is the “extreme pro-naturalness position,” which holds that all correct theories,
4Diversity is highlighted here, since its useful role has not been emphasized directly in the literature.
Of course, many others extra-empirical preferences have strong claims too, such as a coherent and efficient
explanation of causal mechanisms, etc.
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at all times and from all levels of understanding, and from all perspectives no matter how
limited, must be natural and non-finetuned. One can at times even make precision statements
about what numerical values parameters and observables must be bounded by in order to
satisfy the rigid demands of naturalness, such as was even done for superpartner masses by
the original precision finetuning papers of Anderson & Castano [15, 16]. The discussion above
has given plenty of evidence against the surety of such an extreme position.
Second, there is the “extreme anti-naturalness position,” which holds that there is no role
whatsoever in favoring or disfavoring a theory based on finetuning or naturalness assessments.
Finetuned theories at any level of finetuning are just as likely as any other theory. The
discussion above does not prove or even advocate this viewpoint; however, it has demonstrated
that the position is not wholly unreasonable given our current understanding. The literature
has not sufficiently articulated an incontrovertible argument against it, and it remains an
interesting philosophical viewpoint that needs further careful and devoted discussion.
The implications of the “extreme anti-naturalness position” are severe, and are useful to
identify. They are summarized by the SEETA implications discussed in the previous section.
For example, as a very specific illustration, one cannot hold an extreme anti-naturalness posi-
tion and simultaneously declare that low-energy supersymmetry (e.g., all superpartners below
1 TeV) is ruled out by the LHC when there exists even one point in low-energy supersymmetric
parameter space that survives LHC experimental probes, which is currently the case5. Other
implications of SEETA violate first-blush sensibilities of demarcating good vs. bad theories,
but such sensibilities relevant to naturalness need to be articulated much more precisely in
the literature to eliminate the SEETA viewpoint, if it is possible to do so.
Finally, there is the “moderate naturalness position”, which holds that, generally speaking,
theories are not finetuned and they are natural, even though perhaps there is a small fraction
of cases where there is some very high tuning. Such rare cases, however, do not vitiate the
utility of naturalness, just as the rare case of a B meson decaying to a strange meson does
not eliminate the understanding that a B meson decays much more often to a charm meson.
Thus, theories and theory points that appear unnatural and finetuned are generally not really
unnatural and finetuned once we have understanding of a deeper theory from whence the
current theory derives. The discussion above leaves this viewpoint credible also.
An important implication of “moderate naturalness position” is that the search for natural
theories is a valid enterprise. It also implies, on the other hand, that finetuned theories from
our current perspective are not necessarily wrong theories. They could be that way by rare
accident of nature or are seen to not be finetuned from a deeper/different perspective. The
moderate position has a difficult time with questions of “extreme finetuning,” since it implies
that it can never be accidental and new principle(s) must be found to explain it. “Finetuning
that cannot be accidental” is perhaps the best definition of “extreme finetuning”, and it
becomes a research question, not resolved here, how to demarcate between extreme and merely
large finetunings, if a boundary does indeed exist.
Not every view of naturalness and finetuning is fully captured by one of the three primary
5For example, all superpartners are degenerate in mass at 1 TeV.
19
positions described above. Nevertheless, they do reflect qualitative attitudes that have ex-
isted in the literature reasonably accurately. Perhaps the single most important qualitative
viewpoint emerging from this work is that fervid positions on the utility or the non-utility of
naturalness and finetuning arguments have much more work to do to prove their indisputable
merit. There are plenty of disquietudes presented against both extremes, which warrants
careful consideration and tentative adoption of the “moderate naturalness position.”
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